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EDITORIAL
Disaster resilience: a bounce back or bounce forward ability?
Introduction
The debate on disaster resilience has continued to grow, albeit at a slow pace, since the 2005
World Conference on Disaster Reduction held in Kobe, Hyogo, Japan. One of the most
important and striking aspects is that despite the conceptual differences, the resilience
and vulnerability paradigms are still locked together and are increasingly being treated as
if they are one and the same. The reason for this is not a difﬁcult one. Resilience and vul-
nerability are viewed as opposite sides of the same coin (Twigg 2007). However, the notion
of “bounce back” differentiates resilience from vulnerability. The “bounce back” notion is
important to the extent that it liberates resilience from the vulnerability conundrum. Yet, the
“bounce back” notion does not seem to acknowledge that disasters are accompanied by
change.
This paper posits that resilience should be viewed as the ability to “bounce forward” and
“move on” following a disaster (Manyena 2009). Three arguments are presented in this
paper. First, the “bounce forward” ability conceptualisation of resilience has implications
on disaster research and scholarship. It helps us to re-think about the underlying philosophi-
cal arguments, particularly those around structure and agency. Secondly, resilience has tem-
poral and continuity elements, which have implications for pre- and post-disaster planning,
including community continuity recovery planning. Lastly, the “bounce forward” con-
ception has psychological implications. It is optimistic, with a potential of assisting disaster
victims and service providers to adopt positive behaviour changes prior to and after the
disaster.
The ascendancy of the disaster resilience paradigm
The disaster resilience paradigm has gained currency since the start of the new millennium.
Central to the resilience paradigm is its stronger emphasis on capabilities and the ways
people and communities deal with crises and disasters (IFRC 2004, UNISDR 2005). A resi-
lient community is ideally the safest possible disaster-prone community that has the ability
to overcome the damages brought about by disasters either by maintaining their pre-disaster
social fabric or by accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive (Gaillard 2007).
Manyena’s (2006) deconstruction of resilience illustrates that its evolution has not been
straightforward.
The current interest in the resilience concept for disasters mirrors shifts in thinking
about disasters. Furedi (2007) traces three major shifts in disaster “thought”: as Acts of
God; Acts of Nature and Acts of Men and Women. From time immemorial, disasters
were explained as Acts of God’s anger towards his people implying that nothing could be
done about it. During the Enlightenment, with the emergence of science, the causation of
disasters shifted to Acts of Nature. Disasters were blamed on hazards, and hazards wereC
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disasters per se. It was not until the 1970s that disaster causation shifted from Acts of Nature
to Acts of Men and Women. O’Keefe et al. (1976) argue, in Taking the naturalness out of
natural disasters, that disasters were neither Acts of God nor Acts of Nature but a conse-
quence of vulnerability. Wisner et al. (2004) described the 1976 Guatemala earthquake
as “class-quake” due to its selective impact on the poor, as it left the upper and middle
classes virtually unscathed. The emergence of the resilience concept has shifted the focus
to self-reliance as a counter to vulnerability, particularly for the poor and the marginalised.
Whether resilience and vulnerability are one and the same concept or discrete constructs
is still contested. Like most social science constructs, there is some confusion over the deﬁ-
nition of resilience. Twigg (2007) argues that the terms “resilience” and “vulnerability” are
opposite sides of the same coin, but both are relative terms. In this instance, vulnerability
and resilience are assumed to lie on the same continuum but on the opposite poles, with
vulnerability being negative and resilience being positive (Manyena 2006). In this way,
it might be appropriate to assume that when reference is made to vulnerability, there is
an assumption that one would also be referring to resilience as dual terms meaning the
absence of the other means the presence of the other.
Notwithstanding that both constructs may rely on the same factors such as demographic,
social, cultural, economic and political aspects, the two are arguably discrete constructs
(Manyena 2006, Gaillard 2007). The original notion of resilience, from the Latin word
resilio, means to “jump back” or “bounce back”. This refers to people’s recovery within
the shortest possible time with minimal or no assistance at all. The “bounce back” notion
differentiates resilience from vulnerability, implying that the two constructs are discrete.
The “bounce back” ability has its limitations as well; it may be more acceptable to
elastic material than to human systems. Elastic can be stretched (not necessarily in a disaster
situation) and can return to its normal position without change. That disasters are
accompanied by change is a given. Take a few examples. The Bam earthquake, which
occurred on 26 December 2003, in south-east Iran, claimed more than 35,000 lives,
another 23,620 were injured, almost 20,000 homes were destroyed and essential services
including water supply, power, telephone, health care, main roads and the city’s only
airport were crippled (Akbari et al. 2004); this led to major shifts in the social, economic
and physical environments. In Sri Lanka, the 2004 tsunami had a major impact on the
ﬁshing community. Some 90% of the surviving ﬁshing community lost their boats,
ﬁshing nets and homes; this transformed their lives and livelihoods (Venkatachalam
et al. 2009). In Zimbabwe, a decade-long complex political emergency has triggered disas-
ters such as a cholera epidemic. This affected some 100,000 people and claimed 4200 lives
between mid-2008 and mid-2009 (Nelson 2009); this severely disrupted social and econ-
omic stability. In Japan, the 2011 earthquake and subsequent tsunami caused severe
damage to homes, businesses and infrastructure, including the almost total destruction of
the Fukushima nuclear power plant. In terms of change, the plight of the Fukushima
nuclear plant has caused those countries that operate such facilities to re-think about
their power-generation strategies. As Paton and Johnston (2006 Q1) argues, these examples
show that the “bouncing back” neither captures the changed reality nor encapsulates the
new possibilities opened by the changes wrought by a disaster:
This usage [of bounce back], however, captures neither the reality of disaster experience nor its
full implications. Even if people wanted to return to previous state, changes to the physical,
social and psychological reality of societal life emanating from a disaster can make this unten-
able. That is, the post-disaster reality, irrespective of whether it reﬂects the direct consequences
of disaster or recovery and re-building activities undertaken, will present community members
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with a new reality that may differ in several fundamental ways form that prevailing pre-disaster.
It is the changed reality (whether from the disaster itself or social response to it) that people
must adapt to. Paton and Johnston (2006, pp. 7–8) Q1
Arguably, the “bounce back” notion does signal change. But returning to the original pos-
ition does not signal change. It might mean a return to vulnerability and bouncing back to
the conditions that caused the disaster in the ﬁrst place; they may re-create and strengthen
the pre-disaster structures and institutions. Thus, the “bounce back” notion can be associ-
ated with strengthening existing structures and institutions to resist or withstand disasters,
which may also increase community vulnerability rather than their resilience to disasters.
Resilience should be viewed as the ability to “bounce forward” and “move on” follow-
ing a disaster (Manyena 2009). Although this might be considered rather simplistic, there
could be merit in this thinking. As disasters can be conceptualised as a catalyst for change
(Paton and Johnston 2006 Q1), the “bounce forward” notion encapsulates social engineering, if
not community agency, in change processes within the context of new realities brought
about by a disaster. Community agency through advocacy programmes may inﬂuence dis-
aster risk governance where institutions maybe reorganised to increase their capabilities to
deal with the changing nature of risk. What is fundamental here is that the disaster risk gov-
ernance structures and institutions are subordinate to the community agency. Changes that
may take place after a disaster are not by chance – they are a result of rational choices made
by the affected communities and should be transformative. They can include physical,
economic, political and psychological issues. Thus, disaster resilience could be viewed
as the intrinsic capacity of a system, community or society predisposed to a shock or
stress to “bounce forward” and adapt in order to survive by changing its non-essential attri-
butes and rebuilding itself.
Conceptualising resilient or “bounce forward” abilities
A fundamental issue in conceptualising “bounce forward ability” is the evaluation of current
response systems and, more broadly, how we approach prevention and preparedness Q2. The
ways in which societies have prepared themselves to deal with uncertainties and change
have shaped norms, values, customs and practices and governance systems. Adjusting to
changing circumstances and learning fromexperience have always been part of human devel-
opment. Arguably,we have always recognised risk as a part of the everyday life and that often
risk-taking can bring rewards. The ancient Egyptians lived with the risk of annual ﬂood. But
the ﬂoods regenerated their agricultural capacity: an example of both risks and rewards.
In instances where a rapid change has occurred, there has been little time for social learning
processes to re-shape preparedness strategies. Today, the state, in many instances, has taken
the lead in dealing with hazardous events and rapid socio-technological and economic
changes. There has been a drive to make people feel “safe”. Alongside this, there has been
a drive towards the centre and the imposition of a command and control structure.
This drive to centralism can clearly be seen in the way the UK response to disastrous
events has developed after the World War II. This approach was dominated by a civil
defence perspective that was shaped by the threat of a nuclear war. This gradually
shifted to a civil protection perspective. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a
series of disasters leading up to and following the millennium led to a root-and-branch
reform of civil protection. Though resilience was used as a term to characterise the
reform process, in reality, the focus was on institutional resilience (O’Brien and Read
2005, O’Brien 2006). This is a narrow interpretation of resilience, as it restricts the focus
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to an internal view of the capacities needed. For routine events, such as trafﬁc accidents, this
can be very effective and there are many examples of emergency responders who are being
able to cope in quite complex situations and able to use their expertise and specialist equip-
ment to good effect. This view of deploying the right assets to deal with a particular event
and then returning to base sees resilience as the ability to bounce back and prepare for the
next event. Any post-evaluation will be restricted to evaluating how well, or otherwise, the
event was dealt with. This is single-loop learning or error correction. This does not mean
that single-loop learning is not an important part of the preparedness of the response func-
tion. It certainly is. But single-loop learning is practitioner focussed and does not allow a
broader and deeper consideration of the role of the response function. It is the double-
loop or organisational learning that questions the values, assumptions and policies that
led to the actions in the ﬁrst place. If there is scope to modify these, then the organisation
is able to adapt to the signals from both internal and external environments. In short, it exhi-
bits adaptive capacity to changing environments. This is a pre-disaster planning that recog-
nises the importance of adjusting to new post-disaster realities. This is recognition of
resilience as a bounce forward ability.
The case studies of the Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) in the UK and the post-disaster
response to the 2004 tsunami in Somalia show resilience as a “bounce forward ability”. The
UK case study shows how a change in the legislative framework enabled the FRS to focus
on prevention, an example of a questioning approach to the function of the service: in short,
double-loop learning. The Somalia case study shows how a community was able to reﬂect
on the impact of tsunami. This led to a greater understanding of their vulnerability, the start-
ing point for building resilience.
UK FRS case study
The UK Fire Service prior to 2004 was regulated under the Fire Services Act of 1947. The
Act laid down arrangements that were geared primarily to the needs of the Second World
War: it prescribes stafﬁng levels; the location of the ﬁreﬁghters, stations and appliances; and
exactly how many appliances should be used to attend to a ﬁre and within what time frame.
In 2001, the UK government established the Arson Control Forum, a government-led
multi-agency body, to lead the ﬁght against arson. Arson had been an increasing
problem, particularly vehicle arson, since the 1990s. Other studies showed that 50% of
all ﬁre deaths occur before the ﬁre brigade is even called. The FRS Act 2004 replaced
the 1947 Act and put the prevention of ﬁres at the heart of legislation by, for example, creat-
ing a new duty to promote ﬁre safety and by providing the ﬂexibility for ﬁre and rescue
authorities to work with others in the community to carry out this duty, as studies
showed that 50% of all ﬁre deaths occur before the ﬁre brigade is even called. This has
seen a marked shift in the operational mode of the FRS.
This initiative coupled with the 2004 Act saw a surge of effort at ﬁre prevention through
working with young people via the Arson Task Forces. There has been a dramatic drop in
the number of arson incidents. Since then, campaigns aimed at vulnerable households have
signalled a shift to a more proactive approach. This engagement with the public and empha-
sis on prevention are evidence of double-loop learning at the organisational level in
response to changing signals.
Somalia case study
On 26 December 2004, near the coast of Sumatra in Indonesia, the world’s most powerful
earthquake in 40 years struck. The earthquake triggered a series of large tsunami waves
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across the Indian Ocean. Somalia was the worst affected country in Africa. Approximately
650 km of Somalia’s coastline in the state of Puntland primarily between Hafun (Bari
region) and Garacad (Mudug region) were devastated (UNEP 2005 Q3).
The tsunami resulted in the death of some 298 people, thousands of homes were
destroyed and an estimated 103,083 people were displaced (CRED 2011). Water, sanitation
and hygiene facilities were destroyed or contaminated. Food stores were swept away, and
roads and other infrastructures were damaged. Thousands of ﬁshing boats were lost and
ﬁsheries were severely affected. These impacts devastated lives and livelihoods, making
vulnerable people even more vulnerable and in need of emergency assistance.
The fragile livelihood strategies in these areas, heavily dependent on ﬁshing, severely
limited the coping strategies. The tsunami struck during the December peak ﬁshing
season, leading to devastating livelihood impacts. The majority of the households
reduced the number of meals per day, sold assets and requested credit for food and water
in order to cope. Many men migrated to urban centres that were less affected by the
tsunami in an attempt to seek employment. Others managed to secure money from the
Somalia diaspora. The majority of those affected, however, had insufﬁcient food and con-
taminated water sources that led to a steep increase in waterborne diseases such as
dysentery.
In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, aid agencies began trucking water and food
to the affected towns and villages. The lack of infrastructure and insecurity in the region
meant that aid was slow to arrive and always inadequate compared with the needs of the
people. Eventually, towns and villages began developing recovery strategies with aid
agencies with the aim of rebuilding facilities and livelihoods.
A priority for all communities was rebuilding households and restoring water sources.
Communities began rebuilding their homes, some with assistance from international organ-
isations. However, none rebuilt their homes in the same location. All communities relocated
their households further inland.
We’ve seen the damage the sea can do to us, our entire community, we cannot let that happen
again we have to build our houses in a safe place now, a safe distance from the sea.(community
member of Aris town in Puntland, Somalia, 2006)
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) was one of the humanitarian organisations that responded
and worked throughout the affected region. Prior to commencing any work in the villages
and towns, NCA conducted detailed discussions with communities in order to identify their
needs and capacities. NCA’s aim was simply not to rebuild livelihoods or facilities, but to
build resilient livelihood assets. NCA appreciated the communities’ experiences. It believed
that to build resilient communities, these experiences had to be fully incorporated into the
recovery process. An example of this is the re-establishment of access to safe water sources.
The pre-existing water sources for most of the affected communities were single open
fresh water springs. After NCA had conducted community discussions, it was evident that
collecting water from single fresh water springs limited the number of users and placed
great time demands on women and children. The water was often contaminated as the
source was not protected. NCA, together with the local communities, established new
water points. These water points (several per community) were located further from the
beach to ensure protection from future tsunamis and were covered to prevent contami-
nation. If one water point were to become contaminated or dysfunctional, the communities
would still have access to other safe water sources. This is an example of community con-
tinuity recovery planning that recognises the need to move forward to build resilience.
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Commentary
The changes occurring in the UK mirror changes at the global level. The 1990s were
declared as the international decade for natural disaster reduction. The Yokohama Strategy,
1994, marked a conceptual shift from reaction to prevention – a movement from disaster
management to disaster risk management. Following the Yokohama Strategy, the Hyogo
Framework for Action (HFA) 2005–2015: “Building the Resilience of Nations and Com-
munities to Disasters” was adopted at the World Conference on Disaster Reduction
(UNISDR 2005). The HFA clearly signals a move from a command and control environ-
ment to a community-based approach within an enabling policy framework. It seeks to
promote an inter-disciplinary approach to disaster risk reduction and gives a speciﬁc
example by stating that this must promote the integration of risk reduction associated
with existing climate variability and future climate change into the strategies for the
reduction of disaster risk and adaptation to climate change (UNISDR 2005).
It is clear that a more proactive approach to preparedness through resilience building
signals a shift in thinking as shown in the Somalia case study. This has implications for indi-
viduals, communities and organisations. It also signals how we approach learning. Prac-
titioners must still improve their skill levels as well as learn new skills. But it is at the
community and organisation levels that new approaches to learning are needed. There is
considerable expertise in organisational and social learning and capacity building that
can be used to effect these changes. But there is a clear need for research into the ways
in which disaster risk reduction techniques can be incorporated into climate adaptation.
In this edition, Edgeworth explores local coping strategies in disaster risk reduction.
Using examples from rural Bangladesh, he argues that community health can be substan-
tially improved by the community by itself by building responsible resilience planning
that focusses on contentious issues such as the level of outcome and price of inputs. He
further argues that it is not a universal solution, but in places where effective government
structures are absent and little external ﬁnance is available, self-help efforts owned by the
community produce favourable health outcomes.
Using agriculture in Indonesia, Mills and his co-authors provide an example of an
approach to resilience that demands a bounce forward ability. A series of shocks, including
the 2004 Asian tsunami, left a local livelihood system with a challenge not only to build
back better, but to build differently. The key to the difference was an emphasis on diversi-
ﬁcation across both livelihood system and environment. One central issue of the resilience
strategy was to address a wider range of market options indicating that building is a “within
and without” community strategy Q4.
Haidera et al. explain fresh water challenges in Yemen against an uncertain social
environmental future. On the basis of the mathematical modelling that was driven by sta-
keholder considerations, they argue that water deﬁcits will increase under every scenario.
This raises not simply supply issues of increased vulnerability to water shortage, in a situ-
ation where accelerating climate change exacerbates accelerating drought conditions, but
also issues such as what does water, or broader service, resilience mean especially to
poor urban populations Q5.
da Costa Silva raises the linkage between resilience and environmental justice. In a
wide-ranging comparative analysis of community-based watershed management initiatives
in Central and Latin America, she explores the issues of justice and equity. The conclusion
is bold in that she argues that environmental justice frameworks can better inform decisions,
while subtly suggesting that such frameworks largely provide methodologies for action
rather than delivery rights.
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Conclusion
The idea of vulnerability strongly links poverty to disaster causation (O’Keefe et al. 1976).
Many attempts have been made to differentiate vulnerabilities, for example, by age, gender
and ethnicity. On the bottom line, however, whatever be the subconstructs, poverty is the
explanation for vulnerability.
Resilience again has been differentiated along the lines of age, gender and ethnicity. But
one of the reasons for the idea of resilience continuing to be the “ﬂip side” of vulnerability is
that communities tend to be richer communities that can afford mitigation and adaptation
efforts. The notion of bounce forward is to see disaster as an opportunity for local livelihood
enhancement rather than as a simple return to status quo ante.
In many ways, the idea of vulnerability and that of resilience are like that of sustainabil-
ity – there are many deﬁnitions, but this deﬁnition is necessary to maintain the broad church
of progressive practice. More particularly, resilience planning, like sustainability, is already
being practised by communities, even though they do not call it that.
As this issue goes to process, there is a growing conversation on linking resilience plan-
ning to the environmental justice movement. In the past, attempts have been made to
expand human rights to specify that no one is put at risk. These attempts faltered on the
non-justiciability of such a legal right, that is, the inability to take the case to court to
seek redress Q6.
The strength of the environmental justice movement has been essential to successfully
use community mobilisation to confront individual company contamination at speciﬁc
sites, for example, the Toxic Soup in the Mississippi River, known as the Cancer Alley.
The environmental justice movement has been less successful at addressing broader situa-
tional problems such as climate change, and to date, there is no jurisdiction for justiciability
of such global problems. The challenge of resilience is a twenty-ﬁrst-century challenge to
deﬁne institutional, legal and social learning processes that promote poverty alleviation and
thus reduce vulnerability.
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